|tIntroduction --|g1|tSeeing distance from a Berkeleian perspective --|g2|tSize --|g3|tMaking maximum sense of "minimum sensible" --|g4|tHeterogeneity and the senses --|g5|tWhat Berkeley sees in the man born blind --|g6|tThe role of inference in vision --|g7|tMaking occlusion more transparent --|g8|tDirected perception --|g9|tRepresentation and resemblance --|g10|tPictures, puzzles, and paradigms --|g11|tVision and cognition in picture perception --|g12|tThe concept of an "object" in perception and cognition --|g13|tAvoiding errors about errors --|g14|tPluralist perspectives on perceptual error --|g15|tAn Austinian look at the "objects of perception."
|3Table of contents only|uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0709/2006041931.html
These essays by Robert Schwartz on topics in the theory of vision are written from a pragmatic perspective. The issues and arguments will interest both philosophers and psychologists, covering new ground and bridging gaps between these disciplines. Schwartz begins historically, with discussions of problems raised and solutions offered in Bishop Berkeley's writings on vision, presenting Berkeley's views on spatial perception and the qualitative aspects of sensory experience in the context of recent theoretical and empirical work in vision theory. Schwartz then turns to debates in both the philosophical and psychological literature over the view that perception is inferential and thus "indirect." Critically surveying competing characterizations of the idea of "inferential processes" he argues the need either to reframe radically the question or drop the issue. Next, Schwartz discusses pictorial representation and research on picture perception. Drawing on the work of Nelson Goodman, Schwartz explains and defends the advantages of a symbolic approach to both topics. Finally, he examines the quagmires that often develop when metaphysical concerns about the "real" and our ability to perceive it infect discussions and claims in the theory of vision. After analyzing issues arising in current psychological research on "object" perception, Schwartz turns to debates over the supposed essential nature of colors. An appreciation of the empirical and theoretical work on color perception suggests that there is no single or privileged analysis of the notion of "real colors." Schwartz circles back in the end to what he calls "that old chestnut of the philosophy of perception"--controversies over "the objects of perception"--and takes an Austinian look at the topic.